A federal jury here ruled that Google’s use of Oracle Corp.’s Java software didn’t violate copyright law, the latest twist in a six-year legal battle between the two Silicon Valley titans.

Oracle sued Google, a unit of Alphabet Inc [stckqut]GOOGL[/stckqut] [stckqut]GOOG[/stckqut]., in 2010 for using parts of Java without permission in its Android smartphone software. A federal appeals court ruled in 2014 that Oracle [stckqut]ORCL[/stckqut] could copyright the Java parts, but Google argued in a new trial this month that its use of Java was limited and covered by rules permitting “fair use” of copyright material.

A 10-person jury on Thursday agreed.

Google acknowledged using 11,000 lines of Java software code. But it said that amounted to less than 0.1% of the 15 million lines of code in its Android mobile-operating system, which runs most of the world’s smartphones.

Source: Google Wins Java Copyright Case Against Oracle

carly fiorina photoCarly Fiorina is currently a candidate for President of the United States of America. She is campaigning for the nomination of the Republican Party to run in the general election of 2016. According to her, one of her strengths is her business background. Most notable she speaks of her background as the first CEO of a DOW30 company: Hewlett-Packard [stckqut]HPQ[/stckqut].

This site is purposefully non-political. While I tend to be a conservative and have voted for a Republican candidate more times than not, I do not want this site to reflect my personal political thoughts. I will occasionally point out a law or regulation that is tough on investors or the business community, but success at investing must be an apolitical activity. In fact, I have written that investors should probably ignore politics and political turmoil when investing.

I am writing this article simply to analyze the success of Ms. Fiorina or the lack thereof. I am fairly hard on companies and their management. It takes a lot to make my Watch List, and most companies cannot achieve that level of performance. I doubt that HP would have made that list while Ms. Fiorina was CEO, and it certainly cannot make that list today.

donald trump photoIronically, her record at HP is one of the criticisms of Ms. Fiorina. Donald Trump is famous for criticizing her as a failed CEO, and he often cites the writings of Jeffrey Sonnenfeld. It is virtually impossible to compare the success of Donald Trump as CEO with Ms. Fiorina as CEO since Mr. Trump’s businesses are not public entities while most of Ms. Fiorina’s career has been with public entities. It is possible to dig into Ms. Fiorina and see just how lousy she was as the leader of a massive corporation.

I will point out that there is an incredibly different scale in Ms. Fiorina’s career with Mr. Trump’s career. It is unlikely that in 1999-2005 (the time when Ms. Fiorina was CEO of HP) that Mr. Trump’s combined businesses would have cracked the Fortune 500 in revenue. In comparison, Ms. Fiorina was in the DOW30, which the Dow Jones company creates to give the best representation of the overall health of the stock market. In other words, Ms. Fiorina was in the big leagues while Mr. Trump was making a lot of personal money in the minor leagues.

So how did Carly Fiorina do as CEO?

It is probably best to take a look at her critics. Mr. Trump is fairly light on details, but he cites Mr. Sonnenfeld, so let’s look at his criticisms as revealed in Politico.

  • In the five years that Fiorina was at Hewlett-Packard, the company lost over half its value.
  • During those years, stocks in companies like Apple and Dell rose.
  • Google [stckqut]GOOG[/stckqut] went public, and Facebook [stckqut]FB[/stckqut] was launched.
  • The S&P 500 yardstick on major U.S. firms showed only a 7 percent drop.
  • At a time that devices had become a low margin commodity business, Fiorina bought for $25 billion the dying Compaq computer company, which was composed of other failed businesses.
  • The only stock pop under Fiorina’s reign was the 7 percent jump the moment she was fired following a unanimous board vote.
  • Fiorina countered that she wasn’t a failure because she doubled revenues. That’s an empty measurement.
  • She hasn’t had another CEO position since her time at HP

Let’s look at each of these accusations.

In the five years that Fiorina was at Hewlett-Packard, the company lost over half its value.

This is true and is a great reason that it was probably foolish to purchase the stock of HP in that time period. However, to accurately gauge the failure we must look at the reasonable peer group of HP. I contend that the reasonable peer group was Dell, Apple [stckqut]AAPL[/stckqut], Oracle [stckqut]ORCL[/stckqut], IBM [stckqut]IBM[/stckqut], Cisco [stckqut]CSCO[/stckqut], and EMC [stckqut]EMC[/stckqut]. I choose this group for several reasons. They are all quite large and, for the most part, they got their revenue at that time from either selling personal computers or from selling large and complicated systems to the IT departments of major companies.

Unfortunately, Google Finance only shows a weekly price for that long ago. While Ms. Fiorina joined HP on July 19, 1999, and left on February 9, 2005, those dates are not exactly available on Google Finance. The exact dates may be available on other sources but using Google Finance makes it easy for my readers to play with the dates as well as throw in other comparison companies.

HP comparison chart

 

If we look at the above chart it goes from July 9, 1999, to February 18, 2005. This is a very close approximation to Ms. Fiorina’s joining and departure dates. A quick appraisal shows that only Apple and Dell increased in value during this time frame. The other companies decreased in stock value, and most of them decreased in the same approximate range as HP.

In fact, you can see that several of these companies, including HP, had peak prices shortly after Ms. Fiorina joined HP. Many of the companies had significantly bigger drops than HP during the period. If we move the start date to March 2, 2000, you will see that most of these large enterprise-IT sellers had much larger drops in stock value than HP. Obviously, this was a major challenging time for companies that sold in the same market as HP. Even Apple dropped over 70% by the end of 2000. Remember, Apple at this time was not the amazing gadget, phone and entertainment content seller of today, but instead a computer company that was quite reliant on selling personal computers.Read More →

I recently came across this list on Forbes on the largest 25 tax payers. Forbes does a bit of analysis on each of them. It is probably worth your time to jump over, but I thought I would give the highlights here:

 

Rank of tax expense

Company

Symbol

Effective Tax Rate

1 ExxonMobil XOM 39%
2 Chevron Corporation CVX 43%
3 Apple Inc. AAPL 25%
4 Wells Fargo & Co. WFC 31.2%
5 JP Morgan Chase & Co. JPM 26%
6 Wal-Mart Stores WMT 31%
7 ConocoPhillips COP 51.5%
8 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. BRK 28%
9 IBM IBM 24%
10 Microsoft Corporation MSFT 22.8%
11 Philip Morris International Inc. PM 29.5%
12 Goldman Sachs GS 33%
14 Comcast Corporation CMCS 32%
14 The Procter & Gamble Co. PG 23.5%
15 Johnson & Johnson JNJ 23.7%
16 Intel Corporation INTC 23.6%
17 Occidental Petroleum Corp. OXY 42%
18 UnitedHealth Group UHG 35.9%
19 The Walt Disney Company DIS 32.7%
20 AT&T T 27.8%
21 Oracle ORCL 21.4%
22 The Coca-Cola Company KO 23.1%
23 The Home Depot Inc. HD 37.2%
24 McDonald’s MCD 32.4%
25 Google GOOG 19.4%

Company name Oracle Corporation
Stock ticker ORCL
Live stock price [stckqut]ORCL[/stckqut]
P/E compared to competitors Good

MANAGEMENT EXECUTION

Employee productivity Good
Sales growth Poor
EPS growth Poor
P/E growth Poor
EBIT growth Poor

ANALYSIS

Confident Investor Rating Poor
Target stock price (TWCA growth scenario) $12.72
Target stock price (averages with growth) $20.2
Target stock price (averages with no growth) $24.77
Target stock price (manual assumptions) $24.71

The following company description is from Google Finance: http://www.google.com/finance?q=orcl

Oracle Corporation is a provider of enterprise software and computer hardware products and services. The Company’s software, hardware systems, and services businesses develops, manufactures, markets, hosts and supports database and middleware software, applications software, and hardware systems, with the latter consisting primarily of computer server and storage products. It is organized into three businesses: software, hardware systems and services. Its software business consists of two segments: new software licenses and software license updates and product support. Its hardware systems business consists of two segments: hardware systems products and hardware systems support. The Company’s services business consists of the remainder of its segments and offers consulting services, managed cloud services, and education services. On January 25, 2012, it acquired RightNow Technologies, Inc. (RightNow). On April 5, 2012, the Company acquired Taleo Corporation (Taleo).

 

Confident Investor comments: At this price and at this time, I do not think that a Confident Investor can confidently invest in this stock.

If you would like to understand how to evaluate companies like I do on this site, please read my book, The Confident Investor.

The financial and technical news is buzzing this week about Google’s [stckqut]goog[/stckqut] acquisition of Motorola Mobility Inc. [stckqut]mmi[/stckqut] My general rule is that when a company acquires another company that is bigger than 10% of the parent then a Confident Investor needs to get cautious. Google’s revenue is $33.3B and Motorola Mobility’s revenue is $12.7B. Too many companies get very confused and get lost during a merger of this size and this is quite likely to happen here. For this reason, I am removing Google from my Watch List until Google has had some time to integrate MMI.

When the news of the merger first broke, the discussion was all about Google buying the robust library of patents that Motorola Mobility owned. While this is an immediate benefit to Google as they fight in the very litigious environment of mobile platforms, it would be foolish to limit this acquisition to just that portfolio.

Google is paying $12.5B for MMI. This is a pretty high premium to pay for the rights to the patents. If Google just wanted the rights to protect against lawsuits then they could have licensed these patents for far less money. Of course, Kevin Smithen, an analyst from Macquarie USA, thinks that Google only wanted the patents and will spin off the hardware business relatively quickly.

If Smithen is correct then the various Android manufacturers have nothing to fear. In fact, this would be the best of all worlds in that MMI will be severely confused as it moves into Google and then shuffled back out to private equity or some other manufacturer. This would be a recipe for near death for MMI going through that many transitions and their competitors will take advantage of that confusion. The various phone manufacturers would also enjoy the fruits of Google’s largess and have fewer patent problems as Apple[stckqut]aapl[/stckqut], Microsoft [stckqut]msft[/stckqut], and Oracle [orcl[/stckqut] try to stop or get a piece of the Android revenue stream.

However, I do not think that Google will miss the opportunity to compete with their top competitor: Apple. It is very clear that the Android OS will continue to be the most popular mobile phone OS just like Windows on the desktop is the most popular OS. However, just like on the desktop, the preferred vendor is Apple. Whenever a new phone running Android is introduced, it is compared to the gold standard, the iPhone.  Whenever a new version of Android comes out, it is compared to the gold standard, iOS. Whenever a new tablet comes out, it is compared to the gold standard, iPad.

I do not think that that Google wants to be the Microsoft of the phone. Rather, their culture is much closer to being like Apple. If you look at all of the products from Google (usually creating little to no revenue for the company) most of them are about defining and creating a great user experience. This is what Apple has almost always tried to do. The one place that Google doesn’t do this is in mobile phones where their OS, Android, is placed on so many different form factors that they no longer have a great user experience across the entire platform.

The addition of MMI to Google gives them the unique opportunity to create a phone platform that is tightly coupled between hardware and software that is only seen in products from Apple or Research In Motion [stckqut]rimm[/stckqut]. There, though, is the rub. Few companies have been successful at running a business that is equal parts hardware and software. Apple is the only one true success in that area while others were successful for awhile and then struggled (think RIM and Palm). Most companies do not do a great job of being great in both hardware and software. Rather, they focus on hardware (think HP[stckqut]hpq[/stckqut], Dell[stckqut]dell[/stckqut], and Lenovo) or they focus on software (think Microsoft, CA[stckqut]ca[/stckqut], and Oracle[stckqut]orcl[/stckqut]) and they let the other side be “good enough” to support the core. Yes, HP makes software but that isn’t the core of their business and, for the most part, their software is designed to operate their great hardware. Similarly, Microsoft makes computer mice but few people consider this to be the core of what Microsoft is. For years, Oracle was a software only company until they bought Sun, another company that struggled being a software company and a hardware company.

Apple though has carved out a unique position in that they make great software and equally great hardware and they combine the two together to enable an awesome user experience. That is what Google has the potential to do with MMI. It won’t be easy and they could elect to take the easy way out and spin off the hardware business. In addition to being incredibly difficult to do well, it is also risky in that their Android partners would be very unhappy about a well integrated Android phone competing with a “stock” phone running Android. The road to excellence may force Google to upset their partners a great deal and Google simply may not be up to the task of accomplishing this goal.

The Motorola Mobility deal also allows Google to be excellent in another area that is dominated by no one and may be even bigger than mobile phones. Motorola generated nearly $3.6B in set-top boxes and services for television. Google has dabbled in this area of the market without much huge success. The combination of Google’s software with Motorola’s set-top infrastructure could create an integrated environment that would have everyone else on the outside looking in on a very strong revenue stream.

This acquisition could be only about protecting Android from patent suits but that would be a shame since Android doesn’t add significantly to Google’s bottom line. If Google wants to be truly great, this acquisition could be about trying to learn from Apple and teaching the master a trick or two. The question is: can Google out-Apple Apple? While this will be interesting to watch, I would prefer to watch it from the sidelines and not as an investor so I will sit back for a few months to see how this proceeds.